Armed against ARMs : Educating low-income borrowers may be an effective - if oft-overlooked - way to help stabilize the mortgage market by Doug Campbell
B
ack in October 2003, Donna Turner had her eye on
a house. It was a modest house, priced to sell 
at $150,000. For the Raleigh market, that was 
something of a steal. But Turner had a few financial 
obstacles to overcome before she could live the American
Dream. She was a single mother who worked as a certified
nursing assistant, earning about $23,000 a year. Her credit
report was pocked with poor choices and understandable 
setbacks, from delinquent cell phone payments to unwieldy
medical bills.
It added up to a credit score in the mid-500s, putting 
her somewhere among the 15th percentile of the nation’s debt
seekers. By all definitions, Turner was a “subprime” 
borrower, a credit risk so great that mortgage lenders 
would charge her extra — if they chose to take her on at 
all — before putting up the funds necessary to close on her 
dream home.
Turner’s story could have gone several different ways at
that point. She might have been able to secure a subprime
loan, perhaps one of those now much-maligned “adjustable
rate mortgages” (ARMs), which would inevitably balloon in
the years to come, making it impossible for her to keep up
with payments. Turner would end up as another subject 
in a newspaper article about the hardships consumers face 
when taking deals from unscrupulous lenders. It’s a familiar
tale of late.
Or she could have somehow come up with the monthly
payments, even after they increased with interest rates. It’s
less likely you’ve heard of that story, even though it’s actually
more commonplace than the first one. Remember: The
majority of subprime loans are in fact being repaid on time.
Both interesting stories. But perhaps a better one is what
actually happened. Turner didn’t take out a home loan in
2003. Instead, she first walked into the Raleigh offices of
Downtown Housing Improvement Corp., or DHIC. There
she met Sheila Porter, who goes by the title of mortgage man-
ager. Together they spent the next year and a half plotting a
turnaround strategy. It entailed Turner taking a new job, low-
ering her expectations about how much of a home she could
afford, and paying off her bills.
When she had done that, her credit score had risen about
100 points — right on the border between the ability to
obtain a subprime or regular loan. With Porter’s help, Turner
found the latter, as well as downpayment assistance. She
obtained a conventional, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, origi-
nated by a reputable bank. Her monthly payment: $686,
including insurance and property taxes. In March 2005,
mortgage loan in tow, Turner closed on a brand-new, 1,500-
square-foot, three-bed, two-bath home for $122,000.
More than anything, Turner says, she came away from her
mortgage counseling experience with an appreciation for the
commitment she was making. “I mapped out a plan, thought
it through, and stayed the course,” Turner says today. 
“I had to sit down and decide whether I wanted to do this. 
That sense of commitment is one of the best things I 
took away.”
The focus on the role of mortgage brokers and Wall
Street — and even on regulators in the recent decline of the
subprime housing market — is richly deserved. But another
player deserves attention: borrowers. The extent to which
subprime borrowers were grossly misled, took calculated
risks  or simply didn’t understand the details of the contracts
they entered into, is unclear.
But if there is anything to be learned from Turner’s 
experience, it is that financial education can make a 
difference. What if all subprime borrowers received the
counseling that Turner did? Would we even be talking about
the problems in the subprime market?
Subprime Primer
Though standards vary, in general a credit score of 660
(around the national average) or higher may qualify for a
“prime” loan. There is also a near-prime, sometimes called
“Alt-A,” category of loans for borrowers with credit scores
between 580 and 660. Subprime borrowers usually are 
those with credit scores lower than 580 (though by some
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Smeasures, scores below 620 qualify).
Federal regulators define such borrow-
ers as those with records of delinquency
or bankruptcy, and debt-to-income
ratios of 50 percent or more.
As of this fall, prime loans were not
showing signs of major trouble. The
overall delinquency rate (between 30
and 90 days overdue) has stayed close
to 4 percent since the early 1990s,
according to a Chicago Fed paper,
though rising to about 5 percent in the
past year. Fixed-rate, 30-year mort-
gages in fact remain at historical low
levels of delinquency, at around 2 per-
cent. The problem has been in the
subprime market.
Subprime mortgages didn’t gain
much attention until recently, but
their growth began in the early 1990s.
Interest rates were declining, and
some high-risk borrowers turned to
them as a means to refinance existing
mortgages. Meanwhile, technological
improvements made it easier and
cheaper to “score” borrowers’ credit
risks, helping to increase volume in the
subprime category.
Subprime mortgages (defined here
as loans obtained by borrowers with
credit scores less than 620) have
indeed seen a sharp increase in 
delinquencies, overall at more than 
13 percent in early 2007, with ARMs
leading the way at 14 percent. More to
the point, the growth in subprime
mortgages has been astonishing, rising
from 6 percent of all loans as recently
as 2002 to 20 percent at the end of 
2006. (This 20 percent figure includes
a 5 percentage point share for Alt-A
loans.) The share of subprime loans
that are ARMs — with the highest
delinquency rates — stood at 50 per-
cent (or about 7.5 percent of all
mortgage loans) at the end of 2006.
Not only are subprime loans risky, but
half of them are the riskiest possible
— ARMs. Meanwhile, the share of
prime loans that are ARMs stood at
18.2 percent at the end of 2006.
Subprime borrowers of any type will
pay between 2 and 3 percentage points
more than the prevailing prime rates.
For example, a hypothetical subprime
loan originated this fall might carry an
annual rate of 8.4 percent,
compared with 6.4 percent
for a prime borrower.
(Historically, the subprime
spread has been between 200
and 300 basis points, but in
recent months has widened.)
A 30-year, $250,000 loan at
the subprime rate would
require monthly payments of
$1,904 compared with $1,563
for a prime loan — a differ-
ence of more than $4,000 a
year. Economists with the St. Louis
Fed put it this way: “At its simplest,
subprime lending can be described as
high-cost lending.”
Many of the largest originators of
subprime loans are not banks. New
Century Financial Corp., for example,
is a real estate investment trust and
was the nation’s second-largest sub-
prime originator before seeking
bankruptcy protection this spring.
Other nonbanks are parts of bank or
thrift holding companies. Also in the
top 10 are banks like Wells Fargo and
CitiFinancial, as well as thrifts like
Countrywide Financial. But what 
distinguishes a subprime from a prime
loan is the perceived credit risk of 
the borrower. A subprime loan may
include features like interest-only 
payments or zero downpayment or
adjustable rates, but it doesn’t have to.
All these features are also available 
to prime borrowers. So when we dis-
cuss subprime loans, we are generally 
considering mortgages to high-risk
borrowers, or those who fail to provide
adequate documentation on their
income, or to those with high debt-to-
income ratios.
Unquestionably, the subprime revo-
lution extended credit to those who in
previous decades were shut out of the
homeownership market. On the other
hand, it may seem like asking for 
trouble by charging the poorest, or 
the most debt-ridden borrowers extra.
Or, as others have postulated, it may 
be perilous to offer complicated 
financial instruments to relatively
unsophisticated consumers — and 
low-income borrowers tend to fall into 
that category.
Does it Work?
Therein lies the motivation for think-
ing about the power of financial
education. Reliable data are difficult to
find on the impact of pre-homeowner-
ship counseling. With mortgage loans
being sold to investors, tracking them
over time is difficult. There are also
many different forms of counseling
(from workshops to intense, months-
long individual programs), and a
dearth of formal tests matching differ-
ent programs with different outcomes.
In a survey of the literature on 
credit counseling, Richmond Fed
economist Matthew Martin draws
some conclusions that may be quite
pertinent to the subprime market’s
decline. Based on his reading, Martin
says it’s clear that some households
make mistakes in personal financial
decisions, and that “mistakes are 
more common for low-income and
less-educated households.” As such,
low-income households tend to bene-
fit the most from financial education.
A widely discussed study found
that, for low-income borrowers, there
is a connection between prepurchase
counseling and avoiding delinquency.
In 2001, researchers with Freddie 
Mac showed that borrowers have a 19
percent lower delinquency rate after
counseling. Of the different sorts of
counseling, one-on-one was found to
be most effective, with a 34 percent
decrease in delinquency compared
with 26 percent for group sessions 
and 21 percent for home study. 
Similar studies have tried to adjust 
for self-selection — the problem that
results will be skewed because people
who seek counseling in the first 
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place are likely those committed to
improving their credit. These studies
found little difference between 
self-selectors and others in terms of
the difference that counseling made
on their behavior.
In a 2006 paper, economists
Valentina Hartarska of Auburn
University and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega
of Ohio State University found that
counseling has a significant effect 
on borrowing behavior, as it makes
low-income borrowers more aware 
of all their financial options — from
refinancing to default. Counseled 
borrowers grow more “ruthless” in
their decisionmaking, an outcome
that may not always be so great for
lenders. Borrowers, for example,
would now understand that it might
make more sense for them to default
than to refinance.
Hartarska notes in an interview that
her study was fairly limited. It drew
from the experience of an Ohio bank
that provided counseling services as
part of its Community Reinvestment
Act requirements from 1996 to 2000.
The authors looked at a total of 1,338
loans over three papers, comparing
those that occurred before counseling 
(1992 to 1995) and those in the post-
1996 period. That said, Hartarska
believes the results to be quite robust,
and perhaps useful to lenders.
“It means that you can educate and
then you can price your risk based on
the experience that borrowers will
behave slightly differently from what
you would have expected of people with
their income and credit score,” she says.
Hartarska also adds that much more
study needs to take place, a process that
could be aided if lenders made more
data available to researchers.
It may help outcomes, but mortgage
counseling isn’t free. It is supported in
part through government grants.
NeighborWorks America is the main
backer of local nonprofit housing
organizations, with 240 members
across the country. It distributes much
of its $115 million annual (federally sup-
ported) budget to groups like DHIC in
Raleigh. The local organizations can do
a number of things with the money,
from developing properties to hiring
financial educators.
MostNeighborWorks-backed organ-
izations offer some sort of prepurchase
counseling, says Douglas Robinson,
NeighborWorks spokesman. Perhaps
because of that, local nonprofit hous-
ing groups see better results from their
clients: The default rate on subprime
mortgages taken out by their clients is
less than 3 percent, Robinson says,
compared with about 13 percent for all
subprime loans.
“If more families and more 
households had taken advantage of
prepurchase counseling, whether
prime or subprime borrowers, they
would have been better armed,” says
Robinson. “Mortgages can seem to be
perfect that day but with any instant
gratification, if you think about it,
maybe it’s not a good thing.”
“Mortgage Ready”
The sort of homeownership counseling
that Donna Turner received at DHIC
is fairly rigorous — up close and 
personal, and not cheap to provide. 
In 2006, the center shuttled about 
480 people through its program, and
210 ended up buying homes that year.
Abig chunk of DHIC’s clientele exists
because of lender requirements. 
The city of Raleigh, for example,
offers some low-income residents 
up to $20,000 in downpayment 
assistance, but orders first that they
complete a DHIC counseling pro-
gram. Charlotte-based Bank of
America instructed dozens of its
clients in the past year to attend
DHIC seminars as part of their 
mortgage qualification process.
Almost everyone who comes to
DHIC, initially, would be considered a
subprime borrowing candidate. The
counselors here talk about getting
clients “mortgage ready.” The charge
for this service is $25.
Like a lot of nonprofit housing
organizations, DHIC derives most of
its operating revenues from develop-
ment projects, where it builds
low-income housing. Grants provide
cash for services that don’t pay for
themselves, including homeownership
counseling. DHIC owns rental hous-
ing and in 2004 and 2005 sold 54
homes at its MeadowCreek subdivi-
sion, where Turner now lives.
There is a class on adjustable rates.
The counselors walk their clients
through “good-faith” estimates point
by point, highlighting potential trou-
ble spots like high upfront fees or 
the possibility of  ballooning rates
down the road. For many, there is 
subsequent one-on-one counseling to
improve credit scores before even 
trying to secure a loan.
Are some brokers trying to sell
products that borrowers probably
can’t handle? Probably, DHIC coun-
selors say. “Alot of our clients are told,
‘Do it now and then you can refinance
in a year,’” says Porter, who was
Turner’s main mortgage counselor.
“But they probably have to come up
with more out-of-pocket money to do
that because they won’t have enough
equity built up to cover all the costs.
I’ve had clients come in with a good-
faith estimate, and with their credit
score, and I’m thinking, ‘Why are you
being offered this?’”
And yet, some borrowers simply
act on what they want to hear, ignoring
what they know is true.
“It’s more complicated now,” says
Saundra Harper, a sales manager and
counselor at DHIC. “You’ve got so
many different products that have
come on board, like interest-only
loans. I’ve seen lenders come up with
some unbelievable things.”
DHIC does not keep track of its
clients in a systematic way after they
complete their counseling, so there is
no way to say how effective the 
programs have been. Anecdotally,
DHIC staffers offer up evidence like
Turner. And they wonder why there
isn’t a bigger push to support 
pre-homeownership counseling for
low-income borrowers. “We’ve been
asking that question for a long time,”
says Gregg Warren, DHIC president.
He attributes some of the lack of 
motivation to the way mortgages are 
sold to investors, seemingly reducing 
the risk that lenders carry, and thus 
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the white diaspora,” writes Gregory.
“Fewer than half of the nearly 20 mil-
lion whites who left the South actually
left for good. That means that the
white diaspora is best understood 
as a circulation, not as a one-way 
population transfer.”
But black return migration was only
about a third of the rate of white migra-
tion during most decades. Some did
come back even as others departed.
For instance, in 1949, some 43,000
black Southerners returned, about 1.7
percent of all Southern-born blacks
living in the North and West.  
Still, in the 1970s, the return flow of
blacks to the South was evident —
more moving in than moving out.
Between 1975 and 1980, Virginia, the
Carolinas, and Maryland were among
the states gaining the most black 
in-migrants, according to demographer
William Frey.
Frey analyzed migration data from
four decennial censuses. Among other
findings, the South netted black
migrants from all other U.S. regions
during the 1990s, completely reversing
the migration stream. Charlotte,
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Raleigh-
Durham, and Washington-Baltimore
were among the 10 most-preferred
destinations during that time. Atlanta,
however, was the strongest magnet.
New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco lost blacks during the
same period. Also noteworthy: Blacks
were more likely than whites to pick
Southern destinations. Maryland,
North Carolina, and Virginia were
among the 10 states that gained the
most black college graduates during
the late 1990s. 
Black reverse migration reflects
economic growth, improved race 
relations, “and the long-standing 
cultural and kinship ties it holds for 
black families,” according to Frey.
James Macbeth, who is 71 and 
beginning to think about retirement, 
may move back to Charleston. 
His parents, both dead, are buried 
in South Carolina, and his siblings 
have scattered throughout Southern
cities in a return migration of their own.
Over his lifetime, Macbeth wit-
nessed the chain of events that people
like his father set in motion. 
The migratory tide, once it began
going out, forced change as it
rearranged population, employment,
education, attitudes, art, music,
sports, transportation, recreation,
housing, and more. The Great
Migration was driven by more than
the opportunity to improve working
conditions — at least for blacks. James
Macbeth’s father didn’t leave
Charleston just for a good job in New
York at the post office.  “He just 
couldn’t get along with segregation 
in the South.” RF
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causing them to lack incentive to
ensure that borrowers are “mortgage
ready.” (It should be pointed out 
that lenders do carry risk even when 
they sell their mortgages because 
over the long term, if defaults are wide-
spread, then they are certainly worse
off in terms of their future ability to
originate loans and sell them.) “Are we
going to expect Wall Street investors to
support homeownership counseling?”
he asks rhetorically.
Almost three years after her 
purchase, Donna Turner is keeping up 
with her monthly payments and 
tending a small garden out back. She is
the very picture of a happy, responsible
homeowner. “I had always lived with
somebody. And after you pay your part
of the bills, they say get out,” Turner
says. “So I was determined to get to the
point where nobody could ever tell 
me to get out again.”
Turner did it. Economic research
suggests that, while it won’t come close
to working for everyone, she needn’t be
the only exception.  RF
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